The strict limits imposed on this paper make it necessary to confine it to a schematic resume of problems the importance of which demands an extended and exhaustive treatment. For this reason the author feels constrained to treat only a few of the many problems which, when duly considered, are capable of producing a radical modification in the field of epistemology. Likewise, the author cannot arrive at any settled conclusion, since he is hindered by the extent and close reasoning of (...) Heidegger's work, his subtlety, and the fact that his work is not yet completed. The intellectual revolt in which Heidegger's existentialism consists is based in part on a critical restatement of the problem of being and, further, in a series of concepts, namely, the world, utility and presence, the duality of subject and object, ontology and knowledge, all subordinated to the most important and ultimately superior concept of existence. These concepts and their revision, as a point of departure for Heidegger's existentialism, owe their origin to phenomenology and philosophy of life (above all, Dilthey's). From the revision of the above-mentioned concepts, by distinguishing in each one of them what, by reason of its inaccuracy, is a source of confusion, there are derived possible changes which, in the view of the author of this paper, may be described as: (1) the subject-object correlation, (2) knowledge, (3) the intellectual function as ground of the possibility of knowledge, and (4) the categories. With regard to the first problem--that of the subject-object correlation--it must be said that if it does not really disappear in Heidegger, he has profoundly modified it, since he does not accept the view held by his predecessors in all the history of philosophy that in the subject-object correlation there are given: (a) the subject, (b) the object, (c) the act of knowledge, and (d) the categories as entities equipped with absolute independence and unique peculiarities. The old view cannot be true, because, says Heidegger, at the start human existence appears so interested in its own being that there is no extra-subjective being prior to the being of human existence. The extra-human, that which is not purely existential (as human existence alone is), is given as useful, whatever it be. Human existence is comprehension of its own being. This comprehension, at the same time that it establishes the being of human existence, also renders possible whatever else is given, in the manifestation of a what rather than in that of a how. Or it may be that the theoretical yields to a prior qualification and by the same basic principle in the constitution of the world, and this qualification is the pragmatic character of the total reality. In harmony with this, it follows, according to Heidegger, that it is impossible to locate subject and object on the same plane; this is already equivalent to locating existence (who) and reality (what) on the same plane. It means nothing to speak of a determination of the subject by the object or vice versa, since there is no way of proving that a predetermination of the subjective and the objective precedes the determination so as to render possible the determination and with it the correlation. And if this is impossible, the intellectual function which makes knowledge possible is annulled, and every pre-essence of forms or manifestations of theoretic nature, such as the nous, the Platonic ideas, the Aristotelian active intellect or the Kantian a priori--all are dissolved in the presence of Heidegger's thesis of the uniqueness of (human) existence and the world, inasmuch as it affirms that knowledge is merely a modality of being-in-the-world. Finally, with regard to the categories, the chief negation of Heidegger proceeds from the fact that, up to this time, the categories are considered sometimes as situated in the object, sometimes in the subject, and zppear to be valid for all being. Heidegger is opposed to this; he postulates categories for the existentials different from those which prevail for other entities. He does not accept a categorial structure which is closed within itself and incapable of alteration. Finally, for him, the categries are interpretative in contrast to the traditional view that they are entitative and to Kant's view that they are constitutive. (shrink)

In Piñeros Glasscock (2020) I presented a version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument against the Anscombean thesis that intentional action entails knowledge. I defend this argument from recent criticisms by Beddor and Pavese (2022) and Valaris (2021). I argue that contrary to what my past self and my critics suggest, the conclusion of this anti-luminosity argument does not rest on the existence of essentially intentional actions. The argument can be recast based on the humbler premise that agential cognition must represent actions (...) as intentional. I show that this claim is well motivated by precisely the considerations of control behind the objections. (shrink)

I do not wish to deal with all the domains in which the word time enters as if it were referring to an obvious aspect of the world or worlds that we human live. Indeed, the very fact that time can be made an issue of reflection shows us that what the word time connotes changes with the circumstances in which it is used. This situation alone, however, would not constitute a problem inviting us to enter in deep reflections if (...) we just accepted that the context defined the meaning of the word in each case. But we do not do that, and we ask the question what is time? as if we thought that the word time referred to some independent entity or dimension of nature that could be properly disclosed or described if we tried hard enough, even if we could not the final essence of it. I consider, however, that the question what is time? is adequate because it implies from the start the view that time can be properly treated as some kind of independent entity or dimension of nature. And I consider that such a view is fully inadequate because I think that all that we human beings talk about are relations that arises in our operation in language as a closed domain of recursive consensual coordinations of behaviors. Let me explain what I say with a few words about living, language, and cognition, and then answer the question what distinctions do we make or connote when we talk of time? (shrink)

"Knowing how we know" is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and new social and cultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword (...) by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the years since its first publication. (shrink)

At the end of the Meno, Socrates suggests that genuine virtue is knowledge. This is surprising because he has recently concluded that virtue is true opinion. I show that Socrates’ new position is motivated by two commitments. First, that being virtuous requires being responsible for the correctness of one’s actions. Second, that only a knower has this kind of ownership of action. An implication of my argument is that, despite his emphasis on virtuous action in the Meno, Socrates endorses an (...) agent-centred ethics. He thinks the epistemic status of the agent is essential to the assessment of her goodness. (shrink)

¿En qué momento la palabra “crisis” se convirtió en un lugar común para interpretar el presente? ¿De qué vocabularios filosóficos disponemos y/o necesitamos crear para pensar el presente? En este artículo, mi objetivo consiste en plantear un diálogo entre el feminismo posthumano de Rosi Braidotti y la práctica teórica de la descolonización de Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui para elaborar una lectura afirmativa del presente a partir de la visión que estas pensadoras proponen sobre el tiempo, problemática común en la obra de (...) ambas autoras. Se trata de dos prespectivas contemporáneas de pensamiento y práctica política densas e imaginativas que, hasta el momento, no han sido puestas en relación. Establecer y desarrollar los términos conceptuales en que esta conversación puede ser relevante para el análisis crítico de nuestra contemporaneidad y para configurar una comprensión creativa de la temporalidad constituirá el principal aporte de este trabajo. Para abordar esta temática, en primer lugar, atenderé al análisis de la experiencia contemporánea del tiempo como la vivencia de una “crisis sin fin” y me preguntaré, con Myriam Revault, acerca de la capacidad explicativa del término “crisis” para dar cuenta del presente. En segundo lugar, expondré el estudio llevado a cabo por Braidotti sobre la experiencia temporal en el capitalismo actual y discutiré su noción de “sincronización”. Por último, explicaré las fuentes y repercusiones de la multiplicidad y heterogeneidad de los tiempos según la epistemología ch’ixi de Rivera Cusicanqui. (shrink)

The answers to these two questions would have been obvious years ago: Human beings, of course, machines are instruments of human design! But now days when we speak so much of progress, science and technology as if progress, science and technology were in themselves values to be venerated, there are many people that think that machines as they become more and more complex and intelligent through human design, may in fact become alive so that they may supplant us as a (...) natural outcome of that very venerated progress and expansion of intelligence. Also many people seems to think that evolution is changing its nature so that technology is becoming the guiding force in the flow of the cosmic change in relation to us. I do not hold this view. I do not look at progress, science or technology as if they were values in themselves, nor do I think that biological or cosmic evolution is changing its nature or character. I think that the question that we human beings must face is that of what do we want to happen to us, not a question of knowledge or progress. The question that we must face is not about the relation of biology with technology, or about the relation between art and technology, nor about the relation between knowledge and reality, nor even about whether or not metadesign shapes our brains. I think that the question that we must face at this moment of our history is about our desires and about whether we want or not to be responsible of our desires. (shrink)

En el presente artículo nos aproximaremos al misterio del hombre a partir de las reflexiones antropológicas de Gabriel Marcel, presentes tanto en sus trabajos filosóficos como en sus obras dramáticas. En especial, nos centraremos en sus análisis sobre las dimensiones estructurales o metafísicas de la existencia personal. En primer lugar, abordaremos la condición corpórea y encarnada del hombre como punto de partida de toda reflexión filosófica concreta. Además, emprenderemos el estudio de la dimensión itinerante y temporal de la existencia personal, (...) marcada por la esperanzada búsqueda de una plenitud profundamente anhelada. También analizaremos la noción marceliana de “exigencia ontológica” como impulso interior de la apertura a la trascendencia. A su vez, desarrollaremos las reflexiones de Marcel sobre la libertad como conquista del propio ser, y como apertura que se consuma plenamente en la intersubjetividad. De este modo, destacaremos las diversas vías por las cuales nuestro autor buscar que nos dejemos asombrar por el misterio del hombre en su dramática plenitud, que nos interpela al reconocimiento y respeto de su sagrada dignidad. (shrink)

Here they are revised notions of the Western tradition that conform the discourse of poetic reason, and the way that Maria Zambrano assumed them. Her thought examines the possibilities of the words, either poetic or philosophical, to allow persons to get conscience. She attempts to unify both types of words using a notion of love as essential intent for dealing with the otherness, allowing, also, the human being conscious reflection on the affectivity. To achieve this, she revises culture to find (...) ideas and examples to support the poetic reason as loving and hopeful reflection and as a possibility of the humanity to know about its own feelings. (shrink)

Na medida em que o termo espiritualidade é em si mesmo ambíguo, o desafio específico da pesquisa em espiritualidade e saúde enquanto campo é definir de que maneiras o conceito ‘espiritualidade’ pode ser frutiferamente aplicado à saúde física e mental. Uma vez que a relatividade hermenêutica de um conceito humanístico tem de se relacionar com os resultados mensuráveis das ciências empíricas, algumas dificuldades inevitavelmente surgem. Isso não impediu, contudo, a formação de duas abordagens claramente definidas na pesquisa em espiritualidade e (...) saúde; uma a que poderíamos chamar hermenêutica-existencial e a outa mais relacionada às ciências da natureza. Por falharmos em distinguir essas opções, muitas das interações entre a ciência da religião ou os estudos da religião e a pesquisa em espiritualidade e saúde é prejudicada ao ponto da quase ausência de diálogo. Nosso intuito aqui é apresentar e conceituar as duas alternativas nos termos das ciências humanas. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to elucidate some aspects of Karl Popper’s logic of research and place it in the philosophical discussion of scientific discovery. A closer look into his proposal reveals that his work, in the light of recent literature, does point into the direction of some fundamental m..

Este escrito examina el particular enfoque dado por Arthur Schopenhauer a la cuestión de la libertad y su relación problemática con la voluntad humana, la causalidad y el conocimiento. Dicha interacción se enjuicia al no presentar la claridad y suficiencia teórica pretendida por el alemán para tal conjunto teórico. Para esto, se estudia el escrito Sobre la libertad de la voluntad premiado por la Real Sociedad Noruega de las Ciencias en 1839, recogido en el primer capítulo del texto Los dos (...) problemas fundamentales de la ética en la edición española. (shrink)

We propose that to understand the biological and neurophysiological processes that give rise to human mental phenomena it is necessary to consider them as behavioral relational phenomena. In particular, we propose that: a) these phenomena take place in the relational manner of living that human language constitutes, and b) that they arise as recursive operations in such behavioral domain. Accordingly, we maintain that these phenomena do not take place in the brain, nor are they the result of a unique operation (...) of a human brain, but arise with the participation of the brain as it generates the behavioral relational dynamics that constitutes language. (shrink)

Der Mensch ist fähig zu erkennen. Diese Fähigkeit setzt allerdings seine bio logische Integrität (Ganzheit, Unversehrtheit) voraus. Der Mensch kann außerdem erkennen, daß er erkennt. Erkennen (Kognition) als basale psychologische und somit biologische Funktion steuert seine Handhabung der Welt, und Wissen gibt seinen Handlungen Sicherheit. Objektives Wissen scheint möglich, und die Welt erscheint dadurch planvoll und vorhersagbar. Und doch ist Wissen als Erfahrung etwas Persönliches und Privates, das nicht übertragen werden kann. Das, was man für übertragbar hält, nämlich objektives Wissen, (...) muß immer durch den Hörer geschaffen werden: Der Hörer versteht nur dann, und objektives Wissen erscheint nur dann übertragbar, wenn der Hörer zu verstehen (vor)bereit(et) ist. Kognition als biologische Funktion besteht darin, daß sich die Antwort auf die Frage Was ist Kognition? aus dem Verständnis des Erkennens bzw. des Erkennenden aufgrund der Fähigkeit des letzteren zu erkennen ergeben muß. Eben darin besteht meme Arbeit. Epistemologie Der zentrale Anspruch der Wissenschaft ist Objektivität: sie [die Wissenschaft] ist bestrebt, mit Hilfe einer wohldefinierten Methodologie Aussagen über die Welt zu machen. Gerade in der Basis dieses Anspruches liegt jedoch ihre Schwäche: die apriorische Annahme, daß objektives Wissen eine Beschreibung dessen darstellt, was man weiß. Eine solche Annahme erfordert die Klärung der Fragen Worin be steht Erkennen bzw. Wissen? und Wie erkennen und wissen wir? Biologie a) Das größte Hindernis für das Verständnis der Organisation des Lebendigen liegt darin, daß es nicht möglich ist, sie durch eine Aufzählung ihrer Eigen schaften zu erklären. Sie muß vielmehr als Einheit verstanden werden. (shrink)

Natura 2000 is a network of natural sites whose aim is to preserve species and habitats of relevance in the European Union. The policy underlying Natura 2000 has faced widespread opposition from land users and received extensive support from environmentalists. This paper addresses the ethical framework for Natura 2000 and the probable moral assumptions of its main stakeholders. Arguments for and against Natura 2000 were analyzed and classified according to “strong” or “weak” versions of the three main theories of environmental (...) ethics – anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Weak (intergenerational) anthropocentrism was found to underlie the Natura 2000 network itself and the positions of environmentalists, while strong (traditional) anthropocentrism pervaded the positions of economic developers. Land users seemed to fall somewhere between weak and strong anthropocentrism. The paper discusses the relation between ethics and different attitudes towards Natura 2000, highlighting some of the implications for the network’s ongoing implementation. It is shown that Natura 2000 achieves a strong reversal of the burden of proof from conservation to economic development and land use change under anthropocentrism. It is argued that the alleged theoretical divide between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in relation to the burden of proof does not seem to hold in practice. Finally, it is predicted that the weak versions of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, are likely to converge extensively in respect to nature conservation policy measures. (shrink)

This is a critical assessment of today presentations of Jesus of Nazareth’ Kingdom of God in so-called historical-exegetical books. Three of them are selected for a minute criticism. It follows a brief exegesis of all then important Gospel texts about the Kingdom of God as a «future event» or as «present» and «already come» in Jesus ministry. After a close scrutiny, only one Gospel passage (Luke 17:20-21) can be used with some doubts for sustaining that Jesus has proclaimed a Kingdom (...) of God already present. The article concludes with a brief exposition of the conceptions of the historical Jesus view about the Kingdom, and some consequences for the modern transpositions of his view. (shrink)

Philosophers such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson have explained that we cannot derive predictions from judgments such as "he boasted from vanity." Such judgments are also the source of countless painful mistakes. However, are they necessarily unreliable? Often enough, even if only gradually and partially, we get people right. Assuming that we do is already assuming that there must be a connection, if not causal then at least casual, between what a person is, what she does, and how she (...) acts; and that we may describe it correctly. If no ironclad generalizations can be made that connect the way a person is, her reasons, and her actions, how might we describe correctness in judgments such as this?Anscombe... (shrink)

La disolución del poder colonial en la América española creó una serie de interrogantes respecto al ordenamiento jurídico-político de los futuros estados soberanos. En este sentido, Simón Bolívar (1783–1830) insistió en la idea de que el control político de los territorios liberados por él debía estar al mando de un poder central conservador capaz de garantizar los derechos ciudadanos sin menoscabo de la estabilidad sociopolítica del orden republicano. Aunque algunos aspectos del ideario constitucional bolivariano resultaron inaceptables para sus contemporáneos, sus (...) medidas para asegurar el goce de los derechos civiles y políticos de los americanos se ajustaban a la realidad social de su tiempo. Con base en una amplia consulta bibliográfica, el presente artículo examina la concepción bolivariana del cuerpo político a la luz de las circunstancias sociohistóricas a las que el Libertador debió hacer frente. (shrink)

This article inquires whether or not religious beliefs are rational, that is to say, whether or not they can be rationally sustained. The point of the article is not to prove the existence of God, but rather simply to show whether or not religious language has real meaning. To do this, we shall examine the concept of belief in general. Then we shall look at religious beliefs in particular from two opposing points of view: on the one hand, from the (...) position of authors who claim that religious beliefs can in fact be sustained by rational evidence, and on the other hand, from the perspective of other authors who affirm that these beliefs cannot be rationally justified, because spiritual discourse refers to the ineffable, which deprives it of the means to verify or deny its propositions. (shrink)

Existe una opinión, que ha pasado a ser un lugar común. Y fue Platón el que la echó a rodar, irónicamente, primero a raíz de un percance que le ocurriera a Tales de Mileto; luego, con más reverencia, a raíz de los hábitos de su maestro Sócrates. Lo que Platón narra de Tales es que por estar contemplando el firmamento no vio lo que estaba delante de su nariz, y cayó en un pozo, con gran hilaridad de la servidumbre que (...) lo miraba. Y quién no recuerda al Sócrates que nos describe Platón: bajo la lluvia o la nieve, sin percatarse de ellas, sumido por largas horas en sus pensamientos, aparte, como tomando distancia para reencontrarse de un modo más productivo con los otros. (shrink)

En este escrito se trata de mostrar una concepción de la educación como un proceso desarrollado colectivamente a partir de la realización de las “vocaciones vitales” y de la capacidad de “darse cuenta”, en todos los contextos de la vida.